Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. They are needed to model anonymity properties, strong versions of confidentiality, and resistance against offline guessing attacks. Indistinguishability properties can be conveniently modeled as equivalence properties. We present a novel procedure to verify equivalence properties for a bounded number of sessions of cryptographic protocols. As in the applied pi calculus, our protocol specification language is parametrized by a first-order sorted term signature and an equational theory that allows formalization of algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. Our procedure is able to verify trace equivalence for determinate cryptographic protocols. On determinate protocols, trace equivalence coincides with observational equivalence, which can therefore be automatically verified for such processes. When protocols are not determinate, our procedure can be used for both under-and over-approximations of trace equivalence, which proved successful on examples. The procedure can handle a large set of cryptographic primitives, namely those whose equational theory is generated by an optimally reducing convergent rewrite system. The procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of the traces of a bounded number of sessions of the protocols into first-order Horn clauses on which a dedicated resolution procedure is used to decide equivalence properties. We have shown that our procedure terminates for the class of subterm convergent equational theories. Moreover, the procedure has been implemented in a prototype tool Active Knowledge in Security Protocols and has been effectively tested on examples. Some of the examples were outside the scope of existing tools, including checking anonymity of an electronic voting protocol due to Okamoto.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are distributed programs that rely on the use of cryptography to secure electronic transactions such as those that arise in electronic commerce and wireless communication. They are also being applied in new domains such as in Internet voting. For example, French citizens living abroad were allowed to vote via the Internet in the parliamentary elections in 2012 [Fre 2015] . In Estonia, Internet voting has been allowed in parliamentary elections since 2007 [Est 2015] . Internet voting was also deployed in the state elections in New South Wales, Australia, in 2015 [Halderman and Teague 2015] . This has led to increasing demands on the complexity of desired security properties, leading to more complex cryptographic protocols. Given the socio-economic-political consequences and the history of incorrect design of cryptographic protocols, the need for formal proofs of correctness of protocols is of great importance and has been widely recognized. Formal reasoning about cryptographic protocols is challenging as one has to reason against all potentially malicious behavior-all communication between protocol participants is assumed to be under the control of an adversary.
In order to make the task of formal analysis amenable to automation, usually the assumption of back-box cryptography and unbounded computational power on the part of the adversary is made. This adversarial model is often called the Dolev-Yao model, as it is derived from the positions that Dolev and Yao took in their seminal article [Dolev and Yao 1981] . It has proved extremely successful, and there are several automated tools [Blanchet 2001; Armando et al. 2005; Cremers 2008; Escobar et al. 2009 ] that can automatically check trace-properties such as (weak forms of) confidentiality and authentication. While these trace-based properties are certainly important, many crucial security properties can only be expressed in terms of indistinguishability (or equivalence). They include strong flavors of confidentiality [Blanchet 2004 ]; resistance to guessing attacks in password based protocols [Baudet 2005 ]; and anonymity properties in private authentication [Abadi and Fournet 2004] , electronic voting [Delaune et al. 2009b; Backes et al. 2008] , vehicular networks [Dahl et al. 2010 [Dahl et al. , 2011 , and Radio-frequency identification (RFID) protocols [Arapinis et al. 2010; Bruso et al. 2010] . More generally, indistinguishability allows to model security by the means of ideal systems, which are correct by construction [Abadi and Gordon 1999; Delaune et al. 2009a] . Indistinguishability properties of cryptographic protocols are naturally modeled by the means of observational and testing equivalences in cryptographic extensions of process calculi, for example, the spi [Abadi and Gordon 1999] and the applied pi calculus [Abadi and Fournet 2001] . While we have good tools for automated verification of trace properties, the situation differs for indistinguishability properties. This article is an attempt to address this concern.
State of the art. Many results have been obtained in the restricted case of a pure eavesdropper, that is, a passive adversary: For static equivalence, many decidability results have been shown [Abadi and Cortier 2006; Arnaud et al. 2007] , and exact [Baudet et al. 2009; and approximate [Blanchet et al. 2005] tools exist for a variety of cryptographic primitives. In the case we consider, indistinguishability in the presence of an active adversary who can interact in an arbitrary way with honest participants, fewer results are known. Hüttel [Hüttel 2002] showed undecidability of observational equivalence in the spi calculus, even for the finite control fragment, as well as decidability for the finite, that is, replicationfree, fragment of the spi calculus. The decidability result, however, only holds for a fixed set of cryptographic primitives and does not yield a practical algorithm. Current results [Blanchet et al. 2005; Cheval and Blanchet 2013; ] allow us to approximate observational equivalence for an unbounded number of sessions. However, this approximation does not suffice to conclude for many applications, see, for example, Delaune et al. [2009b] and Arapinis et al. [2010] . Our approach overcomes these limitations for some applications in Delaune et al. [2009b] . We still cannot conclude for the e-passport example in Arapinis et al. [2010] , albeit for a different reason: Our procedure does not currently handle else branches in protocols.
Symbolic bisimulations have also been devised for the spi [Borgström et al. 2004; Borgström 2008; Tiu and Dawson 2010] and applied pi calculus Liu and Lin 2010] to avoid unbounded branching due to adversary inputs. However, only , Tiu and Dawson [2010] , and Borgström et al. [2004] yield a decision procedure but again only approximating observational equivalence. The results of have been further refined to show a decision procedure on a restricted class of simple processes . In particular, they rely on a procedure deciding the equivalence of constraint systems, introduced by Baudet [Baudet 2005] , for the special case of verifying the existence of guessing attacks. Baudet's procedure allows arbitrary cryptographic primitives that can be modeled as a subterm convergent rewrite system [Abadi and Cortier 2006 ]. An alternate procedure achieving the same goal was proposed by Chevalier and Rusinowitch [Chevalier and Rusinowitch 2010] . However, both procedures are highly non-deterministic and do not yield a reasonable algorithm that could be implemented. Therefore, Cheval et al. [2010] have designed a new procedure and a prototype tool to decide the equivalence of constraint systems, but only for a fixed set of primitives. Tools have also been implemented for checking testing equivalence [Durante et al. 2003 ], open bisimulation [Tiu and Dawson 2010] , and trace equivalence [Cheval et al. 2011 ] for a bounded number of sessions but only a limited set of primitives. One may note that [Cheval et al. 2011] is the only decision procedure to consider negative tests, that is, else branches, which are crucial in several case studies [Arapinis et al. 2010; Abadi and Fournet 2004] .
Our contribution. In this article, we introduce a new procedure for verifying equivalence properties for processes specified in a cryptographic process calculus (without replication). The messages in the calculus are modeled as terms equipped with an equational theory, similarly to the applied pi calculus. Our main contributions are as follows.
-Our procedure checks for two equivalences that over-and under-approximate the standard notion of trace equivalence ≈ t for cryptographic protocols: The underapproximation can be used to prove protocols correct while the over-approximation can be used to rule out incorrect protocols. -Cortier and Delaune have shown in that observational equivalence coincides with ≈ t for the class of determinate processes. They also give a decision procedure for a strict sub-class of determinate processes, namely, simple processes. We show that the coarser relation coincides with ≈ t , and thus our procedure can be used to verify observational equivalence for the whole class of determinate processes. -A novelty of our procedure is that it is based on a fully abstract modeling of symbolic traces for a bounded number of sessions in first-order Horn clauses. This is in contrast to the constraint-solving techniques employed by Tiu and Dawson [2010] , Cheval et al. [2010] , Cheval et al. [2011] , Baudet [2005] , and Chevalier and Rusinowitch [2010] for verifying under-approximations of observational equivalence. Techniques based on Horn clauses have been extensively used, for example, by Blanchet [2001] , Weidenbach [1999] , and Goubault-Larrecq [2005] , in the case of an unbounded number of sessions. Affeldt and Comon-Lundh [2009] faithfully encode a bounded protocol into Horn clauses with rigid variables. Of these tools, only Blanchet [2001] can verify an equivalence property, which happens to be an under-approximation of observational equivalence. Horn clause modeling of an unbounded number of sessions of security protocols may allow false attacks. On the other hand, we have proven our modeling of a bounded number of sessions to be precise. -Our modelling is fully abstract for arbitrary cryptographic primitives that can be modeled as a convergent rewrite system that has the finite variant property [ComonLundh and Delaune 2005; Escobar et al. 2012] . This allows us to handle a larger class of cryptographic primitives than in Tiu and Dawson [2010] , Cheval et al. [2010] , Cheval et al. [2011] , Baudet [2005] , and Chevalier and Rusinowitch [2010] . Following our work, the recent work by also provides support for rewrite systems that have the finite variant property. They additionally cover associative-commutative theories, even though their experimental evaluation suggests that these theories yield frequent non-termination problems for the associativecommutative theories. Moreover, they only provide support for a restricted class of processes. We were also able to show termination of our procedure for the sub-class of subterm convergent rewrite systems. Please note that deducability and hence static equivalence is undecidable, even for the class of optimally reducing convergent rewrite systems [Anantharaman et al. 2007] . Optimally reducing convergent rewrite theories generalize subterm convergent rewrite systems, while maintaining the finite variant property. Moreover, even though our termination proof does not apply, our tool terminated on specific protocols whose cryptographic primitives can be modeled as a convergent rewrite theories. These included the electronic voting protocols by Okamoto [1997] and Fujioka et al. [1992] , which use trapdoor commitment and blind signature, respectively. -Our procedure is implemented in the Active Knowledge in Security protocols (AKISS) prototype tool and we used it among others to successfully prove anonymity in an electronic voting protocol [Fujioka et al. 1992] . For this electronic voting protocol, this is the first automated proof.
An extended abstract of the article [Chadha et al. 2012 ] authored by R. Chadha, S. Kremer, and Ş . Ciobâcȃ appeared in the European Symposium of Programming in 2012. In addition to the proofs that were not present in the extended abstract, this article also contains the proof of termination for subterm convergent rewrite theories. The proof of termination is by V. Cheval.
PRELIMINARIES
We recall some standard definitions and establish some notations that we shall be using throughout the article.
Terms
Let F be a signature, that is, a finite set of function symbols, and let ar be a function that assigns to each function symbol a natural number. Given a function symbol f ∈ F, we say ar( f ) ∈ N is the arity of f . A function symbol of arity 0 is called a constant. Given a set of atoms A and a signature F, we denote by T F,A the set of terms built inductively from A by applying functions symbols in F. Given sets of atoms A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n , we denote the set T F,∪ 1≤i≤n A i by T F,A 1 ,A 2 ,...A n . We assume that we have the following countably infinite pairwise disjoint sets: a set N of private names, a set M of public names, a set C of public channel names, a set W of parameters, and a set X of message variables.
Intuitively, elements of the set N represent nonces generated by honest principals of a protocol, elements of M represent nonces available both to the adversary and to the honest participants, and elements of C represent names of public channel (e.g., the name of a public network). Elements of W are pointers used by the adversary to refer to messages output by the honest participants in a protocol. We fix an enumeration w 1 , w 2 , . . . of the elements of W. We let x, y, z range over X . We also define the following sets.
Definition 2.1. The set T F,N ,M,W,X , denoted Terms, is the set of all terms, the set T F,N ,M , denoted Messages, is the set of messages, and the set T F,N ,M,X , denoted SMessages, is the set of symbolic messages.
If t is a term, then we denote by vars(t) the set of variables appearing in t, by names(t) the set of names (public or private) appearing in t, and by st(t) the set of all subterms of t. The functions vars, names, and st are extended as expected to sequences and sets of terms. A position is a string of positive natural numbers, and denotes the empty string. The set pos(t) of positions of a term t is defined as usual [Baader and Nipkow 1998 ]. If p ∈ pos(t), then t| p is the subterm of t at position p.
Consider the signature F = {enc, dec, pair, fst, snd} where ar(enc) = 3, ar(dec) = ar(pair) = 2 and ar(fst) = ar(snd) = 1. The term t = pair(enc(a, k 1 , r 1 ), enc(b, k 2 , r 2 )) models the pair of the encryptions of public names a and b with keys k 1 , respectively, k 2 , and randomness r 1 , respectively, r 2 . The set of positions pos(t) = { , 1, 11, 12, 13, 2, 21, 22, 23} and t| = t, t| 1 = enc(a, k 1 , r 1 ) and t| 23 = r 2 .
Substitutions. A substitution is a partial function σ : W ∪ X → Terms. We only consider substitutions that map elements of W to elements in Messages and elements of X to elements of SMessages. The domain of σ , denoted by dom(σ ), is defined as usual:
For our purposes, we only consider substitutions with finite domains. We let
. . , u n } and t i = σ (u i ) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then we shall write σ as { u 1 → t 1 , . . . , u n → t n }. σ is said to be ground if range(σ ) ⊆ Messages. The notation names(σ ) will denote the set names(range(σ )). A substitution σ can be extended to a (total) function σ ext :
As usual, σ extends homomorphically to a function apply σ : Terms → Terms obtained by "applying" σ ext homomorphically. Given t ∈ Terms, we denote apply σ (t) by tσ. If σ is a substitution and X ⊆ W ∪ X , then we denoted by σ [X] the substitution whose domain is restricted at most to X. Given two substitutions σ and τ , the substitution obtained by composing σ and τ , denoted σ τ , is the unique substitution such that σ τ (x) = (σ (x))τ for all x ∈ W ∪X .
Rewriting and Unification
Two terms s and t are (syntactically) unifiable if there exists a substitution σ such that sσ = tσ . We denote by mgu a function that associates to any two unifiable terms s and t a most general unifier σ of s and t such that σ = σ [vars(s, t) ]. It is well known [Baader and Nipkow 1998; Baader and Snyder 2001] that for any two unifiable terms s and t, there is a most general unifier, unique up to variable renaming.
A rewrite system R is a set of rewrite rules of the form → r where , r ∈ Messages, names(l, r) = ∅ and vars(r) ⊆ vars( ). A term t can be rewritten in one step to u, denoted t → R u, if there exist a position p ∈ pos(t), a rule → r in R and a substitution σ such that t| p = σ and u is obtained from t by replacing the subterm t| p by rσ . sequence t 0 → R t 1 → R t 2 → R . . . . It is said to be convergent if it is both confluent and terminating. In a convergent rewrite system R, for every term t there is a unique term t such that t → * R t and there is no u such that t → R u. t is said to be the normal form of t. We denote by t↓ R the normal form of the term t. Two terms s and t are said to be equal modulo R, written s = R t, if s↓ R = t↓ R . Given a substitution σ , we denote by
Example 2.3. Continuing Example 2.2, consider the rewrite system R = {dec(enc(x, y, z), y) → x, fst(pair(x, y)) → x, snd(pair(x, y)) → y}. The first rewrite rule models that a message can be decrypted, provided decryption uses the same key (represented by variable y) as encryption. The two last rules model projection of the first and second component of a pair. Then we have that t = fst (pair(dec(enc(a, k, r) 
We recall the notions of optimally reducing [Narendran et al. 1997] and subterm convergent [Abadi and Cortier 2006] rewrite systems.
Definition 2.4. A rewrite system R is said to be optimally reducing if for any → r ∈ R and any substitution θ such that all proper subterms of θ are in normal form, we have that rθ is in normal form.
Definition 2.5. A rewrite system R is said to be subterm convergent if R is convergent and for each rule → r ∈ R, we have that either r ∈ st( ) or r is a constant.
We immediately note that any subterm convergent rewrite system R can be easily converted into an equivalent optimally reducing rewrite system by replacing every rewrite rule → r in R by → r↓ R .
Example 2.6. The rewrite system R = {dec(enc(x, y, z), y) → x, fst(pair(x, y)) → x, snd(pair(x, y)) → y} given in Example 2.3 is subterm convergent. We shall give examples of convergent rewrite systems that are not subterm convergent when we discuss the case studies on electronic voting in Section 6.2.
Remark 2.7. When R is clear from the context or unimportant we will simply drop the subscript R in → R and ↓ R .
The Finite Variant Property
Given a convergent rewrite system, we now define the notion of complete set of variants, which was introduced by Comon-Lundh and Delaune [2005] . Our notion is slightly stronger than the notion defined in Comon-Lundh and Delaune [2005] and was first introduced in Escobar et al. [2012] . See Cholewa et al. [2014] 
Intuitively, if variants(t) = { σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . σ k }, then the set of terms preterms(t) = { tσ 1 ↓, tσ 2 ↓, . . . , tσ k ↓ } represent pre-computations of all possible instances of t in the following sense: If ω is a substitution and t ω is the term tω↓, then there is a term t ∈ preterms(t) and a substitution τ such that t τ is the syntactic term t ω . No rewrite rules are needed to compute t ω from t τ.
Example 2.9. Consider the rewrite system introduced in Example 2.3 and let t = dec(fst(x), y). We have that variants(t) = {∅, σ 1 , σ 2 } where ∅ denotes the identity substitution and σ 1 = {x → pair(z 1 , z 2 )}, and
Intuitively, the substitution ∅ covers the cases where both the decryption and projection may fail; σ 1 corresponds to the situation where the projection succeeds, but decryption may fail; and σ 2 accounts for the situations where both projection and decryption succeed. Note that the case where projection fails and decryption succeeds is not possible.
In Ciobâcȃ [2011] , Ciobâcȃ presents an algorithm for computing such complete sets of variants that is correct whenever the rewrite system is optimally reducing [Narendran et al. 1997] . Optimally reducing rewrite systems include subterm convergent systems [Abadi and Cortier 2006] (and hence the classical Dolev Yao theories for encryption, signatures, and hash functions), as well as a theory for modeling blind signatures [Kremer and Ryan 2005] . Moreover, complete sets of variants can be used to perform unification modulo R [Escobar et al. 2012; Ciobâcȃ 2011] .
Definition 2.10. Given sets of terms {s i } i∈I and {t i } i∈I , let X = vars({s i , t i } i∈I ). A set of substitutions mgu R ({s i ? = t i } i∈I ) is called a complete set of unifiers modulo R of the system of equations {s i ? = t i } i∈I if each of the following holds:
For singleton systems, we also write mgu R (s, t) instead of mgu R ({s ? = t}). For the remainder of the article, we assume that the rewrite system is convergent and has the finite variant property.
Frames, Deducibility, and Static Equivalence
Recall that we have fixed an enumeration w 1 , w 2 , . . . of the elements of the set W. As in Abadi and Fournet [2001] , we will use the notion of a frame to represent messages that have been recorded by the attacker.
Intuitively, w i in a frame points to the ith message recorded by the attacker in a protocol run. Note that in our definition, every frame with |dom(ϕ)| = n has dom(ϕ) = {w 1 , . . . , w n }. We denote the set of all frames as Frames. The adversary can use the public names as well as recorded messages to construct new messages. This is modeled as the deducibility relation.
Definition 2.12. Any term in T F,M,W is said to be a recipe. We say that a message t is deducible from ϕ with a recipe r (written as ϕ r t) if t ∈ Messages and rϕ = R t. We write Recipes for the set T F,M,W .
Intuitively, the recipe r tells how the attacker can construct the message t from the recorded messages. Note that the same term t can be constructed using different recipes. A frame ϕ = {w 1 → t 1 , . . . , w m → t m } extends a frame ϕ = {w 1 → t 1 , . . . , w n → t n } if m ≥ n and if t i = t i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see that if ϕ extends ϕ and if ϕ r t, then ϕ r t.
Example 2.13. Consider the signature F and the rewrite system R in Example 2.3. Let ϕ = {w 1 → enc(s, k, r), w 2 → k} where s, k, r ∈ N are private names. Then we have that ϕ dec(w 1 ,w 2 ) s. Note that dec(w 1 , k) ∈ Recipes as k ∈ N . If we had that s ∈ M, then we would also have that ϕ s s reflecting that public names are always deducible.
We now recall static equivalence of frames [Abadi and Fournet 2001] to capture indistinguishability of frames. Recall that two terms can be indistinguishable to an attacker even if the two terms are distinct. For example, 0 encrypted using a symmetric key unknown to the attacker and 1 encrypted using the same key are indistinguishable to the attacker. Thus, instead of checking of direct equality between messages, the attacker can perform a series of tests to distinguish between two frames. This is the intuition behind the following definition:
Definition 2.14. Let r 1 , r 2 ∈ Recipes. A test r 1 ? = r 2 holds in a frame ϕ (written (r 1 = r 2 )ϕ) if ϕ r 1 t and ϕ r 2 t for some t, that is, r 1 and r 2 are recipes for the same term in ϕ.
Frames ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are statically equivalent (written ϕ 1 ≈ s ϕ 2 ) iff for all r 1 , r 2 ∈ Recipes we have that (r 1 = r 2 )ϕ 1 iff (r 1 = r 2 )ϕ 2 .
A CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESS CALCULUS
We shall assume that cryptographic protocols are modeled using a simple process calculus that has similarities with the applied pi calculus [Abadi and Fournet 2001] . The applied pi calculus has proven to be useful for specifying and verifying cryptographic protocols; there are tools that automate verification of protocols in this model [Blanchet 2001 ]. We shall further restrict our attention to the finite, that is, replicationfree fragment of applied pi calculus. This restriction is important because observational equivalence becomes undecidable with replication [Hüttel 2002] . With this restriction, one can model a bounded number of protocol instances.
In this section we define our process calculus. We begin by defining its syntax.
Syntax. Recall that we have fixed a first-order signature F, a set N of private names, M of public names, a set C of public channel names, a set W of parameters, and a set X of message variables (see Section 2). The terms of the set T F,N ,M,W,X are also identified modulo a fixed subterm convergent rewrite system R (see Section 2). We model a bounded number of instances of a cryptographic protocol as a finite set of traces. Traces are defined using sequences of actions generated by the following grammar (note that here in and out are fresh symbols not occurring in F):
where x ∈ X , s, t ∈ SMessages, c ∈ C. A trace T is a sequence of actions T = a 1 .a 2 . . . . .a n . As usual, a receive action in(c, x) acts as a binding construct for the variable x. We assume the usual definitions of free and bound variables for traces. We also assume that each variable is bound at most once. A trace is ground if it does not contain any free variables. The set of ground traces shall be represented as GndTraces. We also assume the usual definition of a name occurring in a trace.
A process P is defined to be a set of traces P = {T 1 , . . . , T n }. We say that a process is ground if all of its traces are ground. We identify traces with singleton processes.
Remark 3.1. Contrary to the applied pi calculus [Abadi and Fournet 2001] we do not have an ν operator for generating new names: As we only consider a finite number of sessions, we can simply use private names in N . We have also not explicitly included the parallel operator | and the choice operator +. One could include these and generate the corresponding set of traces. Thus, there is no loss in expressivity. However, we note that an explicit enumeration of the traces can result in an exponential number of traces.
Semantics. The semantics of a process is defined using the semantics of its traces. The semantics of a trace is given in terms of a labeled transition system T. We assume that all interactions between protocol participants are mediated by the adversary. The labeled transition system records the interaction of the protocol participants with the adversary. The set of labels of T is defined using the set Recipes. Recall that the set Recipes is the set T F,M,W (see Section 2). The set of labels, Labels, is
The labeled transition system T is a subset of (GndTraces × Frames) × Labels × (GndTraces×Frames), and we shall write (
The frame in the transition system is used to record the messages that the protocol participants have sent in the past. The relation − → is defined as follows:
The label in(c, r) indicates a message sent by the adversary over the channel c and r is the recipe that adversary uses to create this message. The label out(c) indicates a message sent over the public channel c and the transition rule SEND records the message sent in the frame. Finally, the rule TEST is an internal action.
As usual, we shall write
, and we say that 1 . . . n is a run of (T 0 , ϕ 0 ). We shall write (T , ϕ) ⇒ (T , ϕ ) when 
Process equivalences. In this section we will define various flavors of trace equivalence that will be useful in this article. We first recall the standard definition of trace equivalence in cryptographic process algebras.
Definition 3.2 (Trace Equivalence).
A ground process P is said to be trace-included in a ground process Q (written P t Q) if, whenever (P, ∅) 23:10 R. Chadha et al. such that (Q, ∅) 1 ,..., n = = = = = ⇒ (T , ϕ ) and ϕ ≈ s ϕ . Two processes P and Q are trace-equivalent (written P ≈ t Q) if P t Q and Q t P.
We will also define two other notions of trace equivalence, one coarser and one more fine grained. The coarser trace equivalence, which we denote by ≈ ct , is the trace equivalence that can actually be verified by our procedure.
Definition 3.3 (Coarse Trace Equivalence). Given ground processes P and Q, we say that P ct Q if, whenever (P, ∅) 1 ,..., n = = = = = ⇒ (T , ϕ) and (r 1 = r 2 )ϕ for some recipes r 1 , r 2 , there exist T , ϕ such that (Q, ∅) 1 ,..., n = = = = = ⇒ (T , ϕ ) and (r 1 = r 2 )ϕ . We say that P ≈ ct Q if P ct Q and Q ct P.
The following example illustrates the difference between ≈ t and ≈ ct .
Example 3.4. Let P and Q be the ground processes defined as follows:
Clearly, P ct Q. Observe also that Q ct P. Indeed, only trivial equalities hold on the frame {w 1 → a, w 2 → b}, and therefore these also hold on {w 1 → a, w 2 → a}. Thus, we have that P ≈ ct Q while P ≈ t Q.
We will, however, show that these two notions coincide for a class of determinate processes. In the context of the applied pi calculus, determinate processes were previously studied by .
Definition 3.5 (Determinate Process). We say that a ground process P is determinate if, whenever (P, ∅)
Intuitively, determinate processes are processes in which the adversary's static knowledge at any instance is completely determined by its past interaction with the protocol participants. The following is immediate from the definition. PROPOSITION 3.6. A ground trace, that is, a ground process consisting of single trace, is determinate. that trace equivalence coincides with observational equivalence for determinate processes. We show that ≈ t and ≈ ct also coincide for this class of processes. THEOREM 3.7. If P and Q are ground processes, then P ≈ t Q implies P ≈ ct Q. Furthermore if P and Q are determinate, then P ≈ ct Q implies P ≈ t Q.
As already mentioned above, it was demonstrated in

PROOF.
(⇒) Follows immediately from definition of ≈ t and ≈ ct . (⇐) Let P and Q be determinate processes. We need to show that P ≈ ct Q implies P ≈ t Q. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that P ≈ ct Q and P ≈ t Q. We suppose P t Q (the case of Q t P being symmetric). As P t Q, we have that there exist 1 , . . . , n , T , ϕ, such that (P, ∅) In the first case, we have that P ≈ ct Q, contradicting our hypothesis. In the second case, as ϕ ≈ s ϕ , there exist r, r such that (r = r )ϕ and (r = r )ϕ (or, vice versa, the other case is symmetric). As P ct Q, we have that there exist T , ϕ such that (Q, ∅) 1 ,..., n = = = = = ⇒ (T , ϕ ) and (r = r )ϕ . As Q is determinate, we have that ϕ ≈ s ϕ . This yields a contradiction, as (r = r )ϕ and (r = r )ϕ would imply ϕ ≈ s ϕ .
Additionally, we introduce a more fine-grained notion of trace equivalence, denoted ≈ ft .
Definition 3.8 (Fine-Grained Trace Equivalence). Given ground processes P and Q, we say that P ft Q if for each trace T ∈ P there exists a trace T ∈ Q such that T ≈ t T . We say that P ≈ ft Q if P ft Q and Q ft P.
It follows directly from the definition that ≈ ft ⊂≈ t . The difference between these two relations is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.9. Let P and Q be ground processes defined as follows: enc(a, k) ).out (c, enc(b, k) ).in (c, x) . enc(a, k) ).out (c, enc(b, k) ).in (c, x) . (c, enc(b, k) ).in (c, x) .
where k ∈ N is a private name and a, b are constants. The test x = enc(dec(x, k), k) simply checks whether x is an encryption with key k. It is not difficult to see that
As already mentioned, our procedure is able to check ≈ ct , which coincides with ≈ t when processes are determinate. In the case where processes are not determinate we can use our procedure to check ≈ ct and ≈ ft in order to over-and under-approximate ≈ t . Indeed, as traces are determinate processes a procedure for checking ≈ ct can be used to verify ≈ ft .
MODELING TRACES AS HORN CLAUSES
Our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a trace in first-order Horn clauses. We give the details of this modelling; we start by giving some definitions that we need for defining the predicates used in the logic.
Symbolic labels and symbolic runs. We define the set of symbolic labels as SLabels = {in(c, t), out(c), test | t ∈ SMessages, c ∈ C} and the set of symbolic runs, SRuns, as the set of finite sequences of symbolic labels (see Figure 1 ). The empty sequence is denoted by . Sometimes we simply write (empty space) for . Intuitively, a symbolic label stands for a set of possible labels, and a symbolic run stands for a set of possible runs of the protocol.
Symbolic Recipes. We assume a set Y of recipe variables disjoint from X . The set of terms T F,M,W,Y shall be called symbolic recipes and denoted by SRecipes. We use capital letters X, Y, Z to range over Y. Intuitively, a symbolic recipe stands for a set of recipes.
We extend the definition of substitutions to include variables from Y in its domain. However, we only consider substitutions that map variables in Y to SRecipes. A ground substitution must map variables in Y to Recipes. The notion of most general unifiers is extended to symbolic recipes as expected.
Predicates. The predicates used in our modelling and the semantics of the predicates are given in Figure 1 . The ground predicates are interpreted over a pair: a trace T and a frame ϕ. A predicate P with free variables is interpreted over a triple: a trace T , a frame ϕ, and a substitution σ : We consider four kinds of predicates, all of which have a symbolic run as an argument. Intuitively, the reachability predicate r w says that each run represented by w is possible, that is, does not block due to a test that fails. The intruder knowledge predicate k w (R, t) says that whenever a run represented by w happens, the (symbolic) message t can be constructed by the intruder using the (symbolic) recipe R. The identity predicate i w (R, R ) says that whenever the (symbolic) run w is executed, the (symbolic) recipes R and R are recipes for the same (symbolic) term. Observe that the term t in the definition of the predicate i w (R, R ), if it exists, must be unique (modulo R). The reachable identity predicate ri w (R, R ) is a short form for the conjunction of the predicates r w and i w (R, R ).
Formulas and statements.
We consider first-order formulas built using the above predicates and the usual connectives (conjunction, disjunction, negation, implication, existential, and universal quantification). As in the case of predicates, a formula is interpreted over a triple consisting of a trace T , a frame ϕ, and a substitution σ , and the semantics is defined as expected.
Note that in case f is a ground formula, we shall omit σ as we do not need the substitution σ . If, in addition to f being ground, we have that dom(ϕ) = ∅, then we simply write T |= f for (T , ∅) |= f .
We now identify a subset of the formulas, which we shall call statements. Statements will take the form of Horn clauses, and we shall be mainly concerned with them.
Definition 4.1. A statement is a Horn clause of the form H ⇐ B 1 , . . . , B n where:
for some l 1 , . . . , l k ∈ SLabels, t ∈ SMessages, R, R ∈ SRecipes, j i ≤ k, t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ SMessages, and X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ Y. Furthermore X 1 , . . . , X n are distinct variables and if
We implicitly assume that in a Horn clause all variables are universally quantified. Hence, all statements are closed formulas.
Remark 4.2. We sometimes abuse language and call σ a closing substitution for a statement H ⇐ B 1 , . . . , B n if σ is closing for each of the formulas H, B 1 , . . . B n . Remark 4.3. Let f = H ⇐ B 1 , . . . , B n be a statement.
-f is said to be a reachability statement if H is of the form r l 1 ,...,l k .
-f is said to be a deduction statement if H is of the form k l 1 ,...,l k (R, t).
-f is said to be an equational statement if H is of the form i l 1 ,...,l k (R, R ).
-f is said to be a reachable identity statement if H is of the form ri l 1 ,...,l k (R, R ).
The Set of Seed Statements
As mentioned above, our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a trace in first-order Horn clauses. In this section, given a trace T , we will give a set of statements seed(T ) that will serve as a starting point for the modelling. We shall also establish that the set of statements seed(T ) is a sound and (partially) complete abstraction of the trace T . In order to formally define seed(T ), we start by fixing some notational conventions.
Let T = a 1 .a 2 . . . . .a n be a ground trace. We assume w.l.o.g. the following naming conventions: Moreover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let i ∈ SLabels be as follows:
For each 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let the sets Rcv T (m), Send T and Test T (m), respectively, denote the indices of the receive actions, send actions, and test actions among a 1 , . . . , a m . Formally,
Given a set of public names M 0 ⊆ M, the set of seed statements associated to T and M 0 , denoted seed(T , M 0 ), is defined to be the set of statements given in Figure 2 . If M 0 = M, then seed(T , M) is said to be the set of seed statements associated to T and in this case we write seed(T ) as a shortcut for seed(T , M).
Remark 4.4. Please note that while constructing the set of seed statements, we apply the most general unifier modulo R to all tests. In addition, we also apply finite variants. This allows us to get rid of rewriting in our procedure. system R = {fst(pair(x, y)) → x, snd(pair(x, y)) → y} and the trace
T = in(c, x).[fst(x)
?
= a].out(c, h(s, snd(x))).out(c, s).
Note that s is a private name. The set seed(T , ∅) (ignoring public names) consists of the following clauses:
(1) r in (c,pair(a,x) ).test ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)), (2) r in (c,pair(a,x) ).test.out(c) ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)), (3) r in (c,pair(a,x) pair(a,x) ).test.out(c) ( ,pair(a,x) ).test.out(c).out(c) (w 2 , s) ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)),
).test.out(c).out(c)
where w ∈ {u | ∃v. uv = in(c, pair(a,
x)).test.out(c).out(c)}.
We may note that in the first block of four reachability statements ((1)-(4)), in order to satisfy the test [fst(x) ?
= a], the attacker needs to be able to construct a pair pair(a, x). This condition is obtained by computing mgu R ({fst(x) = a}) = {x → pair(a, x)}. The second block of clauses adds a knowledge clause for each send action in the trace. The third block of clauses represents the attacker capabilities. It computes the set of variants on f (y 1 , . . . , y k ) for each function symbol f in the signature, for example, variants(fst(x)) = {∅, {x → pair(x, y)}} (where ∅ denotes the identity substitution).
We shortly show that the set of seed statements is a sound and (partially) complete modelling of a trace. However, we need one more definition to state this fact.
Definition 4.6. Let K be a set of statements. We define H(K) to be the smallest set of ground terms such that:
(Equivalently, H(K) is the least Herbrand model of
We show that as far as reachability predicates and intruder knowledge predicates are concerned, the set seed(T ) is a complete abstraction of a trace (please see the Electronic Appendix for the proof): THEOREM 4.7. Let T be a ground trace.
Remark 4.8. Please note that the set seed(T ) is only partially complete in that we have not shown in Theorem 4.7 that if ϕ R t and
We will shortly show how the completeness of seed(T ) can be built on to achieve (a) full abstraction of the trace T and (b) a procedure for checking equivalences ≈ ct and ≈ ft .
PROCEDURE FOR DECIDING TRACE EQUIVALENCE
We shall now describe a procedure for deciding trace equivalence. At a high level, this consists of two steps.
(1) A saturation procedure that constructs a set of simple statements from the set seed(T ), which we will call solved statements. The saturation procedure ensures that the set of solved statements is a complete abstraction of T . (2) Given two processes P and Q, we saturate the set of seed statements for traces of P and Q and then use the solved statements to decide whether P and Q are trace equivalent.
We shall now give the details of the procedure. We start by the saturation procedure.
Knowledge Bases and Saturation
The saturation procedure manipulates a set of statements called a knowledge base: -f is said to be solved if for all 1
-f is said to be well-formed if one of the following holds:
(1) f is not solved.
(2) f is a solved reachability, equational, and reachable identity statement.
A set of well-formed statements is called a knowledge base. If K is a knowledge base, then we define K solved = { f ∈ K | f is solved} to be the knowledge base restricted to the solved statements.
Given an initial knowledge base K, the saturation procedure produces another knowledge base sat(K). The saturation procedure proceeds as follows. First new statements are generated and then the knowledge base is updated with the new statements. This two-step process continues until a fixed point is achieved. We describe the two steps in the procedure.
Generating new statements. Given a knowledge base K, new statements f are generated by applying the rules in Figure 3 . Each of the rule generates a new statement h. The rule RESOLUTION applies the standard rule of resolution from first-order logic to an unsolved and a solved deduction statement and allows us to propogate constraints imposed from a partial execution of a trace to its possible extensions. The rule EQUATION allows us to derive new identities on recipes that may be imposed by the execution of the protocol. The rule TEST allows us to conclude which identities necessarily hold in an execution of the protocol. Once the statement h is generated, we update the knowledge base K with h. The process of updating K with h, denoted K ⊕ h, is explained below:
Update. The first step while updating the knowledge base by f is to convert f into a canonical form.
Definition 5.2. Given a solved deduction statement f , we define the canonical form of f to be the statement f ⇓ obtained by first applying Rule RENAME below as many times as possible and then applying Rule REMOVE below as many times as possible:
For any other type of statement f , the canonical form f ⇓ is defined to be equal to f .
It is easy to see that any statement f can be converted into a canonical form. After a canonical form has been obtained, we perform another check before f ⇓ can be added to the knowledge base. This check ensures that we do not add unnecessary knowledge statements that could otherwise entail non-termination (see Example 5.7 below).
Definition 5.3. The set of consequences of a knowledge base K, denoted conseq(K), is the smallest set such that
Given a knowledge base K and a statement f , the update of K by f , denoted K ⊕ f , is defined to be K ∪ { f ⇓} if the head of f is not of the form k 1 ,..., k (R, t). Otherwise, let
if f is solved and for any R we have that
where K = conseq(K solved ). Please note that update is not a function, namely that there may be sev-
. However, we need to compute only one such R , i 1 , . . . , i n .
Initial knowledge base. One question that naturally arises is the following: What is the initial knowledge base for the saturation procedure? Given a trace T , the initial knowledge base for the saturation procedure is defined as follows.
Definition 5.4. Given a set of statements S, the initial knowledge base associated to S, denoted K i (S), is defined to be the empty knowledge base updated by the set S, that is, K i (S) = (((∅ ⊕ f 1 ) ⊕ f 2 ) . . . f ) where f 1 , . . . , f is an enumeration of the statements in S. If T is a ground trace, then we write K i (T ) for K i (seed(T )).
Please observe that K i (T ) depends on the order in which statements in seed(T ) are updated. The exact order, however, is not important, and our results hold regardless of the order chosen. The saturation procedure takes K i (T ) as an input and produces a knowledge base sat(K i (T )). The reason for choosing K i (T ) instead of seed(T ) as the starting point of the saturation procedure is that seed(T ) may not be a knowledge base (recall that a knowledge base is a set of well-formed statements). For instance, given a trace T = in(c, x).out (c, x) we have that k in(c,x) .out(c) (w 1 , x) ⇐ k(X, x) ∈ seed(T ). The set K i (T ) is, however, a knowledge base. This is an immediate consequence of the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5.5. If K is a knowledge base and f is a statement, then K ⊕ f is a knowledge base.
PROOF. We first observe that if a statement f is well formed, then K⊕ f is a knowledge base, as equational statements are well formed and the canonical form preserves well formedness, that is, if f is well formed, then f ⇓ is well formed as well.
If a statement f is not well formed, then it is a solved statement of the form
where u is a prefix of u. By rule AXIOM
and therefore we have that
. . , B n }, which is a knowledge base as equational statements are well formed.
Example 5.6. Continuing Example 4.5 on the trace
we have that K i (seed(T )) = seed(T ). After saturating the initial knowledge base the set sat(K i (T )) solved contains in particular the following additional solved statements: pair(a,x) ).test.out(c) (
where w = in(c, pair(a,
x)).test.out(c).out(c).
Statement (14) is obtained by first applying RESOLUTION on statements (5) and (12) (defined in Example 4.5), yielding ,pair(a,x) ).test.out(c) (
Applying again RESOLUTION on the above statement and statement (7), we obtain (14). Statements (15) and (16) are obtained in a similar way.
To obtain statement (17) we apply EQUATION on statements (14) and (13), yielding
Applying RESOLUTION on this statement and statement (15) yields (17).
Statement (18) is obtained by applying TEST on statements (16) and (17).
Example 5.7. We now present a second, contrived, example that illustrates the need of computing an update based on our set of consequences. Consider the signature F = {f, g, h} where ar(f) = ar(g) = 2, ar(h) = 1, the (subterm convergent) rewrite rule
demonstrating the need of verifying whether a statement is already a consequence or not.
5.1.1. Soundness and Completeness of the Saturation Procedure. We shall now show that the set of solved statements in sat(K i (T )) is a sound and complete abstraction of a trace T . We need one more definition that extends H(K) and allows us to establish that sat(K i (T )) is a complete abstraction of T .
Definition 5.8. Let K be a set of statements. We define H e (K) to be the smallest set of ground terms such that H(K) ⊆ H e (K) and closed under the following rules:
We have that the set of solved statements produced by the saturation procedure is a sound and complete abstraction of the trace T (see the Electronic Appendix for the proof): THEOREM 5.9. Let T be a ground trace and let K = sat(K i (T )).
-(Soundness.) For any f ∈ K ∪ H e (K), T |= f .
5.1.2. Effectiveness of the Saturation Procedure. We have shown that the set of solved statements in sat(K i (T )) form a sound and complete abstraction for the trace T . However, the set sat(K i (T )) may, a priori, not be computable for several reasons.
-As the set of public names M is infinite, the set seed(T ) for a ground trace T is infinite as well. -For the update rule, we have to check that, given a knowledge base K, a term t, labels 1 , . . . , k , indices 1 ≤ i 1 , . . . i n , ≤ k, variables x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X , and recipe variables
Furthermore, if the check succeeds, then we have to compute one such R. -The saturation procedure may itself not terminate even if the initial knowledge base is finite.
We now address each of these three reasons.
First, we show that we only need to consider the saturation of the set K i (seed(T , M T )) where M T is the (finite) set of public names occurring in T . The set sat(K i (T )) can then be computed from the set sat(K i (seed(T , M T ))) by adding the set of clauses K useless M,R which is not required for the saturation and is defined as follows.
Definition 5.10. Given a set of public names M ⊆ M and a set of solved reachability statements R we define
The following is proved in the Electronic Appendix:
LEMMA 5.11. Let T be a trace and M T ⊆ M be the public names occurring in T . Then
where R is the set of solved reachability statements in sat(
Since the set K i (seed(T , M T )) is finite, this means that all intermediate knowledge bases in the saturation procedure are finite.
Second, we show that the update step can be computed if we only have a finite number of statements in the knowledge base (see the Electronic Appendix for the proof):
LEMMA 5.12. Given a finite set of solved statements K, term t, labels 1 , . . . , k , indices
If the answer to the decision procedure is "Yes," then we can compute one such R.
Third, we show that our procedure terminates for the class of subterm convergent rewrite systems (Definition 2.5). It has been shown in Anantharaman et al. [2007] that deducibility is undecidable for convergent optimally reducing rewrite systems. As observed in [Abadi and Fournet 2001] , this immediately implies that static equivalence is also undecidable for convergent optimally reducing rewrite systems. As our algorithm would allow us to decide static equivalence as a particular case, we cannot expect a general termination result. However, we prove that the saturation procedure does terminate for the class of subterm convergent rewrite systems (see the Electronic Appendix for the proof): THEOREM 5.13. Let T be a ground trace and S = seed(T ). For a subterm convergent rewrite system, the computation of sat(K i (S)) terminates in a finite number of steps.
We remark that the saturation is nevertheless sound and complete for the more general class of convergent rewrite systems for which the finite variant property holds. Indeed, the procedure may also terminate on protocols that rely on rewrite systems that are not subterm convergent. This is demonstrated in our case studies when analyzing protocols using blind signatures and trapdoor commitment schemes.
Algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm to decide trace inclusion for determinate processes. In algorithm 1, we describe the checks REACHABILITY and IDENTITY, which allow us to test whether a trace-represented by the set K of solved statements in the saturated knowledge base associated to this trace-is included in a determinate process P (see the Electronic Appendix for the proof): THEOREM 5.14. Let T be a ground trace, P a ground process, and K = (sat(K i (T ))) solved . We have that -If T ct P, then REACHABILITY(K, P) and IDENTITY(K, P) hold.
-If P is determinate and REACHABILITY(K, P) and IDENTITY(K, P) hold, then T ct P.
Note that performing the tests requires deciding if, given t, and w, k w (R, t) ∈ H(K) for some recipe R for a knowledge base K containing only solved statements. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to checking if (k w (R, t) ⇐) ∈ conseq(K), and we have already shown that there is an effective procedure for this (which finds an R if such an R exists). The equivalence T ≈ ft T models real-or-random secrecy of s. Our algorithm can be used to show that T ft T . In particular, IDENTITY(K, P) does not hold. Indeed, as shown in Example 5.6, we have that
where w = in (c, pair(a, x) ). test.out(c).out(c) . Let σ = {x → c 1 }. We have that k (pair(a, c 1 ), pair(a, c 1 ) ) ∈ H(K) and ,pair(a,c 1 ) ).test.out(c).out(c)
where ϕ = {w 0 → h(s, c 1 ), w 1 → s }. However, (w 0 = h(w 1 , c))ϕ demonstrating that real-or-random secrecy does not hold.
PROTOTYPE AND CASE STUDIES
The AKISS Prototype
We implemented the procedure for checking equivalence in a prototype, AKISS. AKISS is written in OCaml and has about 2, 000 lines of source code, including code for computing complete sets of finite variants and complete sets of equational unifiers. We used AKISS to verify the equivalences in Examples 3.4 and 3.9. Using AKISS, we were able to verify strong secrecy for Denning-Sacco-Blanchet [Blanchet 2004 ] and Needham-SchroederLowe (NSL) [Lowe 1996 ], resistance to guessing attacks in the Electronic Key Exchange (EKE) protocol [Bellovin and Merritt 1992] and, more interestingly, anonymity of the Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta (FOO) [Fujioka et al. 1992 ] and Okamoto [Okamoto 1997 ] electronic voting protocols.
1 To our knowledge, AKISS is the only tool that can verify FOO and Okamoto completely automatically. We discuss each of these examples in more detail below. In Arapinis et al. [2013] , the tool has also been extended to verify a property called everlasting privacy that appears in electronic voting. Several other protocols were analyzed in this context. AKISS along with all the discussed examples is available on:
http://akiss.gforge.inria.fr In order to ease protocol specification, we add to the process calculus syntax an operator interleave, denoted , which models parallel composition of processes, and an operator sequence, denoted ;, which is used in modeling of protocols structured in phases. These constructs are merely syntactic sugar and are defined as follows. Given processes P and Q, we define P; Q as the sequential composition of each trace in P with each trace in Q, that is,
Let denote the empty sequence, a 1 , a 2 be actions and T , T 1 , T 2 traces. The parallel composition of two traces is the process defined inductively as
The parallel composition is then naturally lifted to process, that is,
The operator reflects the usual notion of parallel composition in process calculi. One may note that the number of possible interleavings (and hence generated traces) is exponential. We can, however, slightly lower this number due to the fact that test actions are silent, that is, unobservable. We therefore define an optimized interleaving operator o that generates fewer interleavings. In practice, this gain is substantial on several examples. In the following, we let τ (and decorations of τ ) range over test actions, that is, actions of the form [s ?
= t] for some terms s, t. α (and decorations of α) range over input and output actions. The optimized parallel composition of two traces is the process defined inductively as
Intuitively, we consider sequences of silent actions together with the following visible action as atomic. We will now show that this is indeed a sound optimization when checking trace equivalence by showing that P 1 P 2 ≈ t P 1 o P 2 (see the Electronic Appendix for a proof).
PROPOSITION 6.1. Let T 1 , T 2 be two ground traces.
From this proposition, it is easy to conclude that (P Q) ≈ t (P o Q).
Security Properties and Case Studies
We now give more details about our case studies.
Strong flavors of confidentiality. The strong secrecy property was introduced in Blanchet [2004] and we rephrase it here in our setting. Let P be a protocol with x as the only free variable of P. Then x is said to be strongly secret if
Intuitively, the attacker cannot distinguish the processes using variables x 1 and x 2 , even though it can choose arbitrary (public) values for these variables. The definition generalizes to multiple variables in the expected way. We illustrate this property on a Denning-Sacco-Blanchet protocol. Informally, the protocol can be described as follows:
A sends to B a fresh symmetric session key k together with A's and B's public keys. This is signed with A's secret key and (asymmetrically) encrypted with B's public key. Upon receiving this message, B decrypts it, checks the signature, and uses the fresh session key to symmetrically encrypt a secret x. The detailed protocol model is given in Figure 4 . We note that the rewrite system is subterm convergent. We used AKISS to verify this protocol for strong secrecy of x (with one session of A and B). This protocol is determinate, and hence we used ≈ ct to verify that P 1 ≈ ct P 2 . The verification succeeds as expected. A variant of the protocol [Blanchet 2004 ] consists in letting A also send out a secret y encrypted with k changing the first message to A → B : pair(aenc(sign(pair(pk(ska), pair(pk(skb, k))), ska), pk(skb)), enc(y, k)).
In this case, the protocol does not respect strong secrecy of x, y as, by choosing x 1 = y 1 and x 2 = y 2 , the attacker can distinguish the two situations by testing the equality of the encryptions of x and y. The detailed model is given in Figure 5 . This attack is again found by AKISS.
AKISS also verifies strong secrecy of the nonce generated by the responder in the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) [Lowe 1996 ] protocol. The NSL protocol is a two- way handshake protocol relying only on public encryption of fresh nonces and can be informally described as follows:
Once again, the modelling of NSL leads to a subterm convergent rewrite system and determinate processes. We therefore used ≈ ct for our verification. The detailed model is given in Figure 6 . This model includes a session of the initiator who is willing to engage with any participant (including the attacker to allow man-in-the-middle attacks) and a session of B who is willing to engage a session with A. Note that if B was willing to start a session with an arbitrary initiator, then the secrecy of n b would be trivially broken in a session with the attacker. (In a more complex model, one could of course add additional sessions for B with an arbitrary initiator.) We note that for the verification of NSL, one needs to explicitly model randomness for asymmetric encryption since the protocol is insecure if deterministic asymmetric encryption is used. Indeed, as the attacker may choose the value of n b , he or she could simply recompute the last message and compare it with the message sent by the initiator.
We also used AKISS to verify the above protocols for real-or-random secrecy. Let P be a protocol and n ∈ names(P). Then n is said to be real-or-random secret if
where n is a fresh name, that is, a name that does not appear in P. Real-or-random secrecy is particularly useful to model resistance to offline guessing attacks in password protocols [Baudet 2005 ]. Intuitively, an offline guessing attacks works in two phases. In the first (online) phase, the attacker interacts with the protocol P in an arbitrary way. In a second (offline) phase, the attacker tries all possible passwords against the data recorded in the first phase. Our property states that the attacker cannot distinguish the case where he or she tests the real password (n) from the case where he or she tests a wrong password (n ). We show that the EKE protocol [Bellovin and Merritt 1992] is resistant to offline guessing attacks. The protocol can be described informally as follows:
In the first step, A generates a new private session key k and sends the corresponding public key pk(k) to B, encrypted (using symmetric encryption) with the shared password w. Then, B generates a fresh symmetric session key r, which he or she encrypts (using asymmetric encryption) with the previously received public key pk(k). Finally, he or she encrypts the resulting ciphertext with the password w and sends the result to A. The last three steps perform a handshake to avoid replay attacks. Using AKISS, we have shown that the protocol resists offline guessing attacks on the password w. As EKE is modelled by a subterm convergent rewrite system and determinate processes, we used the ≈ ct relation. The detailed description of our model is given in Figure 7 . Anonymity for electronic voting protocol. A voting protocol must respect voter privacy: The adversary should not be able to learn how each voter voted. AKISS can automatically verify voter privacy in the FOO electronic voting protocol [Fujioka et al. 1992] and the Okamoto protocol [Okamoto 1997 ]. Voter privacy is naturally modelled as an equivalence property [Delaune et al. 2009b; Backes et al. 2008] : It is not possible to distinguish the situation where honest voter A votes "yes" and honest B votes "no" from the situation that A votes "no" and B votes "yes." Note that our modelling of the protocols, which we make precise below, is exactly the same as in Delaune et al. [2009b] . We assume that only voters A and B are honest while all other entities are dishonest. An arbitrary number of dishonest voters are, however, subsumed by the attacker and need not be modelled directly.
We now briefly describe the two protocols. The FOO protocol relies on blind signatures and a commitment function. The rewrite system is specified in Figure 8 . We note that the rewrite system is not subterm convergent, but it is optimally reducing. The protocol In the first phase, the voter V commits to his or her vote v, which he or she blindly signs and sends to the election administrator A. A checks eligibility of V and then signs the blinded commitment. Blinding the commitment ensures that A cannot trace the ballot. V unblinds the signature and obtains a ballot that is signed by A. In the second phase, V submits the signed ballot to a collector C, who publishes all the submitted ballots on a public bulletin board. Finally, in the third phase, V submits the random r, which allows us to open the commitment to C, who again publishes this value on the bulletin board. The election can now be tallied by any observer. The detailed model is given in Figure 8 . Note that only two honest voters need to be modelled for showing anonymity. All remaining voters and election authorities are subsumed by the adversary. The processes A yes B no and A no B yes model the situation where these two honest voters have swapped their vote. The protocols do not lead to determinate processes. Therefore, we proved the relation A yes B no ≈ ft A no B yes .
We will not give a detailed description of the Okamoto protocol and refer the reader to Delaune et al. [2009b] . The protocol is a variant of the FOO protocol, which aims to achieve receipt freeness. To avoid vote selling, a voter should not be able to provide a receipt of how he or she voted to a potential coercer. In the FOO protocol, this is possible by sending all private names to a coercer. The main tool to avoid this problem in the Okamoto protocol is the use of trapdoor commitment functions. These functions allow us to change the value of committed vote using a secret value called the trapdoor. x, y, z), f(x, y, z, x 1 ) ) → x 1 f(x 1 , f(x, y, z, x 1 ), z, x 2 ) → f(x, y, z, x 2 ).
Intuitively, a trapdoor commitment tdcommit(x, y, z) commits to x using the key y and trapdoor z. The commitment can be opened using key y to x. However, knowing the trapdoor z, one may compute an alternate key f (x 1 , y, z, x) that opens the commitment tdcommit(x, y, z) to x 1 rather than x. This rewrite system is again optimally reducing but not subterm convergent and out of the scope of most tools, even in the simpler case of a passive adversary. The only result we are aware of that can verify protocols for the case of passive adversary and that uses trapdoor commitments is Ciobâcȃ et al. [2009] .
As for the FOO protocol, we used the relation ≈ ft to prove anonymity.
To our knowledge, no other tool can handle the above two protocols automatically. We are aware of two other attempts for verifying the FOO protocol. Using ProVerif [Blanchet 2004 ], Delaune et al. [2008] verify a transformation of the protocol. However, the soundness of this transformation has never been proven. Chothia et al. [2007] verify a different notion of anonymity (also based on process equivalence) using the μCRL tool. However, the attacker they consider is only an observer that cannot interact with the protocol participants, yielding only a finite state system.
Efficiency. On a standard modern laptop, AKISS takes a few seconds to carry out the above verification, except for the verification of the Okamoto protocol, which takes about 30s. Most of the computational effort goes into the saturation of the traces. Interleaving individual roles of a protocol introduces an exponential blowup on the number of traces and saturations to perform. However, we believe that we can scale to larger protocols and more sessions by parallelizing the saturation of these traces (e.g., on clusters of machines). An implementation performing saturations in parallel is currently in progress.
CONCLUSION
In this article we present a novel procedure for verifying equivalence properties for a bounded number of sessions of cryptographic protocols. The procedure has been implemented in a tool that is able to handle examples that are out of the scope of existing tools.
There are several directions for future work. The implementation of the tool should be optimized, and we plan to analyze more examples coming from electronic voting, RFID protocols, and auction protocols, which all have requirements stated in terms of equivalences.
We would also like to extend the procedure to be able to take disequalities into account. On the one hand, disequalities will allow us to verify processes with else branches, which are important in a number of practical examples. On the other hand, characterizing disequalities in our decision procedure would allow us to directly decide trace equivalence based on static equivalence (rather than static inclusion). Another direction would be to extend the procedure to allow Associative-Commutative operators in order to treat protocols based on exclusive-or and Diffie-Hellman exponentiations.
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX
The electronic appendix for this article can be accessed in the ACM Digital Library.
